REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 31 protection to safeguard Lebanon’s built heritage and archaeology if it had been fully enforced. There are five articles of particular relevance: Article 56 states that excavations may not take place without state authorisation as represented by the Directorate General of Antiquities (DGA) Article 59 states there must be a contract between the DGA and the excavator. Article 18, in particular, stresses that it is forbidden to destroy or damage in any way either standing remains or movable antiquities. Article 26 relates to the registering of antiquities as historic monuments, stating that this can only be done by ministerial decree based on the advice of the DGA Article 19, possibly one of the more crucial laws in the case of Beirut’s archaeology, states that plans for the expansion of cities and their enhancement may be decided following the approval of the DGA. An engineer from the antiquities department must help to establish these plans. Both Articles 18 and 19 gave the DGA, in theory, full power to protect the urban archaeology, even if developer-led large-scale urban excavations had been virtually unknown in 1933, and they would have been effective even on the scale required by Beirut’s post-war development if the DGA had sufficient trained personnel to implement them. From archaeological investigations prior to 1990, it is known that Beirut sat on significant archaeological deposits, however, the actual extent and depth could only be estimated. In November 1993, a document entitled Rehabilitation de la Direction Generale des Antiquites et Soutien à la reconstruction du Centre-Ville ed Beyrouth was signed by the Lebanese government, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UNESCO. The DGA oversaw the excavations of the city centre, while UNESCO, via an International Scientific Committee, advised. Finances for the excavations, for the first year at least, principally came from the Hariri Foundation (US$1 million) and the UNDP (US$300,000). There was, however, no further provision for finances beyond the first year. Due to the large scale of the work ahead, the Minister for Culture and Higher Education, called for international assistance with the archaeological project. Teams from 15 different institutions, from Lebanon and Europe, worked on at least 133 excavations in the BCD area. Many of the excavations initially doubled as training sites, such as the American University of Beirut (AUB) and Leverhulme excavations of the Souk. All institutions involved were aware that archaeological work must not delay the reconstruction works, and that their work would be coordinated by a committee incorporating representatives of the General Directorate of Planning, the DGA, the CDR and Solidère, chaired by the General Director of Planning (Sandes 2010: 93). When funding from the Hariri foundation and UNDP ran out, Solidère took over financing most of the archaeological work, though some money also came from sponsoring institutions such as the Leverhulme Trust and the University of Amsterdam. The funding available was notably insufficient and there was a lack of an overall plan for the archaeology, even after agreements had been reached to allow for excavation; projects were handled on a site-bysite basis. Once the infrastructure works were nearing completion in 1996, private developers could begin to redevelop individual plots. Archaeology was still seen by many merely as something likely to cause delay and expense, and site set-ups sometimes disappeared overnight or when no-one was around supervising (Kabbani 1992: 45-46; Sader 2001: 225). To that end, the reconstruction of Beirut offers some profound lessons for other reconstruction projects that will inevitably need to ensue in the region. WHAT LESSONS HAVE WE LEARNT? Addressing local needs Reconstruction must be focused on local economic and social needs rather than those of globalised purely financial interests. The vast sums spent developing the BCD into an area for international investors and tourists have left it particularly vulnerable to geopolitical and economic recession. Community-centred approaches Priority must be given to redeveloping a city centre that is lively, inclusive and as important to city residents as it is to investors and tourists. Rebuilding the city centre is essential but so too is an integrated plan for the whole city. The fact that there is no major new school, university, social housing, popular market or popular gathering place in the BCD is a major problem. If a city fails to attract people it will not provide the returns to investors. The souk, which holds a functional, financial and nostalgic role could have been utilised to provide opportunities for local artisans and farmers and to encourage local social interaction and mutual tolerance. Instead it was polarised with high-end commercial stores Remains of the iconic 1960s cinema building, ‘The Egg’, are still visible from Martyrs’ Square.
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